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mAPTER I 
. 
INTROOOCl'ION 
In Jul3, 1968 a Federal Reserve System Committee. which had been 
established to reappraise and where~ necessary recommend rede&ign of 
Federal Reserve lending facilities, made its report. l The Committee 
stated that the objective of its propos&ls was to reduce instability in 
financial markets, which is. caused bY' short-run adjustments in bank 
2pr1mar.r reserve positions, without hampering overall monetar,y control. 
These are really two separate and not necessar~ compatible objectives. 
One is to relieve stress in the financial markets bY' facilitating primary 
reserve adjustments. The other is to improve control over the suPPlr 
of reserves to the banking system. 
The purpose of this paper is to consider how well these two obe 
jectives might be met if the Committee's propos&ls are adopted. It 
is assumed that the basis for decisions at commercial banks is maximicat­
ion ot profits in the long run. 
_ IIlReappraisal of the Fed~ral Reserve Discount Mechanism: Report 
ot a System Committee," Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, July, 1968 (hereafter referred to as Committee Report). Reprint­
ed in the Federal Reserve Bulletin, July, 1968, p. 545. 
2Ibid•• p. 1. 
2 
'lhe 	ColIIDIittee proposals can be ouWned as tollows: 
Present system 
1. 	 Level of the Discount rate. 
Set by each Reserve bank: with 
the approval of the Board of 
Governors. The level of the 
rate is part ot the Fedaover... 
an policy. 
2. 	 Administration ot the: discount 
v:lndow. 
Each Reserve Bank controls the 
borrowinga of the member banks. 
in its district based on the 
prinCiples set forth in Regu. 
lation A. i.e. "continuous use 
ot Federal Reserve credit is not 
considered appropriate". The 
appropriate uses of credit ~e: 
a. 	 unexpected temporar,y need 
tor funds. 
b. 	 seasonal needs which cannot 
be met by the banks own re­
sources. 
c. 	 emergena,v needs. 
Proposal 
No change. 
De-tines more specifically 
the credit available to 
individual banks: 
a. 	 short-term adjustment 
credit. 
(1.) basic borrowing 
priviledge. Sets 
quantity limits on 
the frequency. dur­
ation and amount a 
bank: can borrow from 
the Reserve Bank 
with no questions 
asked. 
(2. ) other adjustment 
credit. Credit 
beyond (1.) which 
is subject to ad­
ministrative action 
by the Reserve Bank. 
b. 	 seasonal borrowing priv1ledge. 
In addition to a.. a bank 
that can demonstrate a 
seasonal outflow of funds 
can quality to borrow the 
amount of the seasonal out­
flow that is greater than 
1~ of average deposits. 
c. 	 no change in emergency 
lending to member banks. 
The details of the Committee' a proposals are discussed ruther in 
Chapter V. 
tis paper is organized as follows: Qlapter II examines in greater 
detail the two objectives of discount reform. Olapters m and IV propose 
:3 
• theoretical tramework tor analyzing the waT in which Federal Reserve 
lending to banks can attect the tinancial markets and the supp~ ot 
primar,v reserves to the banking sTstem. Chapter V develops an aggregate 
. 
8Upp~ function ot primary reserves at the discount window based on the 
recommendations in the Committee Report. and & protit maximizing demand 
function tor borrowed reserves. In Chapter VI. the behavior ot borrowed 
reserves during the primary reserve adjustment process is examined to 
determine its possible ettects on money market rate stability and on 
the supp~ ot primarT reserves to the banking system. F'irial.ly'. Chapter 
vn summarizes the results ot the inqu1ry'. 
" 

CHAPTER II 
THE OBJECTIVES OF DISCOUNT REFORM 
The two objectives of discount reform are proximate objectives 
of monetary policy. That is, by promoting them it is believed the 
ultimate goals of full-employment, price stability, economic growth 
and extermal balance can be more readil3' achieved. Why stability in 
tinancial markets and the suPPl3' or reserves to the banking system 
should be used as proximate objectives of Federal Reserve discount 
policy is another question and one which remains outside the scope of 
this paper. The purpose here is to determine onl3' the extent to which 
central bank lending under the new proposals will achieve the stated 
objectives. 
The teras used to describe the objectives need precise definition. 
The tirst objective, as stated in the Committee Report, is to "lessen 
80me of the causes (i.e., short-term adjustment in bank reserve positions) 
ot instability in the financial markets". To paraphrase the Committee's 
language, the objective is to lessen instability in the financial markets 
which is caused b,y short-term adjustments in primar,y reserve positions 
or banks. Instability in the financial markets is signified b,y the 
frequency of changes in direction in rates and b,y the size of rate 
aovements per unit time. No attempt will be made to quantify a condition 
ot unstable market rates. For the purpose here, instability will in­
crease when the frequency or directional changes increase and when the 
size or the rate movements in either direction increase per unit of time. 
s 

The financial markets affected bT bank behavior can be separated 
into two categories based on the two broad types ot earning assets 
held bT banks - monetary assets and default risk assets. Monetary 
a,sets are short-term, readily marketable.· fixed in money value and 
tree ot default risk. The earning monetary assets which banks hold 
include short-term Treasur,y securities, Federal funds sold. commercial 
paper. acceptances, loans to U. S. Government securities dealers. and 
negotiable certificates of deposits purchased) Non-earning monetarT 
assets are primar,y reserves. 
As the term implies, default risk assets have the characteristics 
ot credit risk and are subject to varying degrees ot marketability 
ranging, at best, trom that ot earning monetary assets, to those having 
no marketability at all. Default risk assets include loans and longer 
term securities. 
The market in which monetary assets are traded will. be called the 
lIoney market, and it is here that banks make short-term primary reserve 
adjustments. More generally, the money market is where large wealth­
holders with temporary excess liquidit.y can employ their cash funds 
in earning assets for short periods of time at little or no risk of 
default, and where large wealth-holders with temporary cash deficiencies 
can obtain funds tor short periods ot time. 4 The principle credit 
instruments in this market were mentioned above when describing the 
earning Ilonetar,y. assets of banks. The two most important tor reserve 
:3 Roland I. Robinson, Money ~ Capital Markets (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1964) t p. 96. 
4 Ibid. 
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adjustment are TreaSU17 Bills and Federal f'unds. 
The markets in which default risk assets are issued and traded 
will be called the credit market. The principle feature which distin­
guishes this market from the money market i8 the existence of default 
risk and use of the assets in this market mainly for income and capital 
gains objectives rather than liquidity objectives. 
The financial market to be considered for observing the extent 
of instability in rate movements caused b.y primary reserve adjustment 
will be the money market as described above. The justification for 
singling out this market and the problems raised b.y doing so are 
discussed below in Chapter IV. 
Short-term as used here means intra-reserve period, intra-month.q' 
and seasonal time periods. The reserve position of a bank is the re­
lation of its actual holdings of primary reserves to its desired holdings. 
Primary reserves are deposits at the Federal Reserve banks and vault 
currency and coin. The distinguishing feature is that no rate of return 
is earned on these assets, and they can be used to fulfill legal reserve 
requirements. Adjustment is the process by which banks change their 
actual primary reserves to their desired holdings. 
As stated above, the second objective of discount reform is to 
inprove the central banks control over the amount of reserves supplied 
to the banking system. The Committee Report is not explicit in stating 
this goal. It wants to lessen money market instability l'without hampering 
overall monetary controlII (p. 1). Monetary control is control of the 
5 The reserve period is now one week tor all banks. Seasonal 
time periods vary in length from one to six months. 
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stock of money and is employed by the central bank in its attempt to 
achieve the objectives of general economic policy.6 There are three 
factors which jointly determine the stock of money: 
1. Tbe stock of primar,y reserve assets in the monetar,y s,ystem. 
2. 	 The publics preference toward holding IlOney in the form of 
deposits or currency. 
,. The ratio between primar,y reserves and deposits maintained 
by the banking s,ystem.? 
At best the central bank has direct control over number one. Given 
the relationships in two and three, the central bank will improve its 
control over the money stock by improving its control over the stock 
of primary reserve assets in the monetary system. This paper will 
use control over the stock of banking system primary reserves as a 
pr~ of monetar,y control and as the second major objective of discount 
reform. The details of the reserve supply process are given below. 
6 Harry G. Johnson, "Monetary Theor,y & Policy", American Economic 
Review (June, 19(2), p. 335. 
? Milton Friedman & Anna J. Schwartz, A Moneta!y History of the 
United states 1867-1960 (Princeton University Press), 1963, p. ,50.­
QlAPTER nI 
THE SUPPLY OF PRIMARY RESERVES TO THE BANKING SYSTEM 
.. 
The following is proposed as a framework for ana~zing the effect 
of oentral bank lending on monetar,r control. It will be used to examine 
the conditions under which me.ber-bank borrowing can improve or diminish 
the central bank's control over the amount of primar.y reserves supplied 
to the banking system. 
Currency and coin, and deposits at the Federal Reserve Banks are 
the only two assets that quality as primary reserves. The faotors which 
determine their supply are: 
1. 	 U. S. Government Securities and Acceptances held by the 
Federal Reserve Banks (S). 
2. 	 Federal Reserve Float (F). This is the total amount of 
credit given to one member bank (p~ee) without a corres. 
ponding charge to another bank (payor) during the check 
clearing process. 
). 	 Fedeaal Reserve Bank discounts and advances to member banks (B). 
4. 	 Gold stock (GS). 
5. 	 treasury Currency outstanding (Tc ). 
Not all reserve funds supplied b,y the above factors are avail­
able to the banking s.ystem as primary reserves. Non-banking-system 
8 The first three items are called Federal Reserve Bank Credit 
outstanding. The accounts supplying and using reserve funds are shown 
in the Federal Reserve Bulletin table: "Member Bank Reserves. Federal 
Reserve Bank Credit and Related Items." 
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uses 	of reserve funds are: 
1. 	 Currency and coin held by the public (C ).p
2. 	 Currency and coin held by the Treasllr)' (ct). 
J. 	 Treasury deposits at the Federal Reserve Banks (Dt). 
4. 	 Foreign deposits at the Federal Reserve Banks (Dr). 
5. 	 other deposits at the Federal Reserve Banks (Do). 
6. 	 other Federal Reserve Bank accounts net (OA). This consists 
of capital accounts and the net value of minor accounts. 
The differency between total reserve funds supplied, and non­
banking-system uses is the stock of primary reserves available to the 
banking system 	(Rs): 
Rs= (S + F + B + GS i: Tc) - (C + <;, + Dt + Dr + Do + OA). (1)p 
Some of the terms in (1) usually have small week-to-week changes and, 
consequently, are of minor importance in determining week-to-week changes 
in Rs. These are Ct , Df , Do and OA in the non-banking-system uses of 
reserve funds, and Tc and GS in the factors supplying reserve funds. 9 
Of all the variables determining Rs ~ only S is completely con­
trolled by the central bank. B is joint~ determined by central bank 
supply conditions and the member bank demand function for borrowing, 
both of which are discussed later. The remaining variables are deter­
mined by a variety of market forces and institutional practices, and 
9 Of the non-banking-system uses of reserve funds. c;, is by 
far the most important in its total amount. I).uoing July, 1968, Cn 
averages 95'1> of total non-banking-system uses of reserve funds. In 
the same period, U. S. Government securities accounted for 73'1> of 
the total factors supplying reserve funds. This proportion has been 
increasing since the beginning of the Federal Reserve system. 
--
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are outside of the centralb~ direct control. 10 For example, GS 
is determined by the relative co_odity prices ed rates of return in 
the United states and other coUntries. Cp is determined by the public's 
preferency to hold currenc.y rather than bank deposits. F is determined 
by the size of deposit tlovs among banks that make clearing settlements 
through the Federal Reserve Banks. . The determinants of Rs which are 
not under the central bank's direct control will be referred to as 
market determined variables. In order to emphasize the distinction 
between market determined variables and controlled variables, equation 
(1) is abbreviated. by combining the variable whose week-to-week change 
are relatively minor (~, Df , Do' OAt GS and Tc) into 0, and by grouping 
it in brackets with the other variables that are not directly controlled 
by the central bank: 
Rs = S + B + (F + 0 - c., !'. Dt) (2) 
0= GS + Tc - ct - Df - Do - OA en 
The volUJDe of primary reserves available to the banldng system is 
determined by Federal Reserve holdings of Securities, Sf which is 
directly controlled by the central bank; by the size of member bank 
borrowing; and by four market determined variables which are not dir­
ectly controlled by the central bank. Equation (2) can be further 
abbreviated to combine the four market determined variables into one 
term. I. for the purpose of showing how B ilnproves or diminishes the 
10 The ce~tral bank can indirectly influence such variables as 
G, Cp, and Dr via its influence on market rates of return. Float (F) 
is directly determined by Fed to the extent that Fed sets the time 
lag for crediting checks cleared through it. But once these terms 
are set. the amount of F is out of the central bank's direct control. 
11 
oentral bank's control over Rs: 
Rs I: t (St Bt X) (4) 
The conditions under which B will improve central bank control 
over Rs can be stated trom (4). It will increase the central bank t IS 
control over Rs if it behaves in a pattern 'b offset changes in the . 
uncontrolled and market determined variables summarized in I. B 
diminishes central bank control over Rs if its behavior oftsets 
changes in the controlled variable, S. B. has a neutral eftect on 
aonetar,y control it it does neither. In other words, for B to improve 
central bank control over Rs ' it wst behave in a manner that would 
counter unwanted changes in Its caused by the market determined variables 
in X. Since the central bank's innuence over Rs is derived from its 
control over S, changes in S are a pr~ for central bank policy with 
respect to Rs. If B behaves in a manner to otfset the policy changes 
in S, it is reducing central bank control over Rs. As Meigs has stated, 
liThe central bank may not have effective control over of total reserves, 
in the American s,yste~, because the banks ~ oftset open-market oper­
ations with changes in the volume of their borrowings.n11 
The manner in 'Which B. is likely to behave can be established by 
examining the banking system demand function for B and the supply con­
ditions tor B as proposed in the Committee Report. This is done after 
the primar,y reserve adjustment process is forJlnllated • 
. 11 A.. James Meigs, .!!!!. Reserves .!:!!!! ~ Money: SUppl,y (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. JO. 
CRAPl'ER rv 
THE PRIMARY RESERVE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS 
The problem of this section is to develop a theor,y of the banking 
system primar,y reserve adjustment process which can be used to analyze 
its effect on the money markets. Specif1~, it will be used later 
to show how this adjustment process oan be destabilizing with respect 
to the rates of return on reserve adjustment instruments. In order to 
focus on primar,y reserve management, many of the interesting details 
of the monetary system have been left out. After the adjustment process 
is presented, some of these simpl1tications will be discussed. 
Primary reserve adjustment is a process central to money supp~ 
theor,y. The traditional textbook monetary multiplier is based on a 
demand for primary reserves which is exact~ equal to the leg~ required 
amount.12 That is the demand for excess re~erves is alwqs zero. In 
equilibrium (i.e., no change in deposits and earning assets of the 
banking system) actual reserves equal required reserves--required 
reserves being the same as desired reserves: 
rD =R 
r =legal reserve ratio 
D =total deposits 
R =actual stock of primary reserves available to the banking 
system. 
Since excess reserves are assumed to be zero, an exogeneous~ determined 
12 ~ster V. Chandler. !h! F..con0m!cs .2!. Money ~ Banking, 4th ed. 
Harper and Row, 1964). Chapter 5. 
~.... 
l' 

R yallds a given D, and earning assets are known by the balance sheet 
constraint L = D - R (L:; earning assets). 
'!he central bank directs changes in the money stock (D) by setting 
the reserve adjustment process in motion. That is, it increases or it 
reduces R so that rD I: R. It actual reserves are made greater than 
required (desired) reserves, the individual. banks w1ll try to reduce 
this holding of R by buying earning assets (L). But, such action 
passes the unwanted reserves onto another bank and for the banking 
8,fstem as a whole, actual. reserves cannot be reduced. So. the reserve 
adjustment process continues until required reserves have risen to 
equal the actual reserves. Here the banking system is in equilibrium 
agaib. Adjustment continues until: 
r,o,D :;OR 
The change in desired reserves (r 4 D) equal.s the change in actual. re­
serves (AR). The relation between the A R and AD is the multiplier 
l/r: 
AD = l/r AR. 
More recent work in money supply theory has attempted to explain vari­
ations of desired reserve from required reserves and, in so doing, has 
applied the modern theories of the demand for money and other financial 
assets to commercial. bank behavior. 1, This work and the above basic 
l' cf., Karl Brunner and Allan Meltzer, "Some FUrther Investigation 
of the Demand and SUpply Function for Money," Journal !!1. Finance (May', 
1964), p. 240; Frank deleeuw, I~ Model of Financial Behavior. II The 
Brookings Quarterq Economic Model .2!!h! u. S•• edited by James Duesen­
berry (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company,l9b5). p. 512; W.G. Dewald, 
!'Free Reserves. Total Reserves and Monetary Control, II Journal of 
Political EconoD\Y (April, 1963), p. 141. 
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outline of the monetary process provide the point of departure for the 
following formulation of the primar,y reserve adjustment process. 
I. THE DFlUND FOR EX:CESS RESERVES 
The theory of primar,y reserve adjustment proceeds from assumptions 
regarding. the behavior of individual banks. A simplified balance sheet 
of a single bank is: 
RR + ER + ~ + E2 =TD 

ER + RR =TR 

RR =required reserves. 
Eft =excess reserves (in th.e legal sense). 
It =earning assets of the type traded in the money markets. 
Ez =earning assets of the type traded in the credit marlcet"Se 
TD =total deposits subject to reserve requirements. 
TR =depos:1ts at FRB and vault cash (primary reserves). 
Some asset and liability accounts (e.g., bank premises and capital 
accounts) are lett out on the grounds that they do not intluence the 
reserve adjustment decisions facing the bank. Required reserves (RR) 
are set b,y the legal reserve rat:1o and the volume of deposits subject 
to that ratio. 14 Earning assets, it and ~, are both alternatives to 
14 Since September, 1968, there haw been significant changes in 
the computation of required reserves. They are: (1) Placing all banks 
on a one-week reserve period. (2) Using average deposits two weeks 
earlier as the base for week~ average required reserves for the current 
week, cn Count:1ng vault cash held two weeks earlier and balances at 
Fed. in the current week as the current week's legal reserves held, and 
(4) Permitting banks to carry forward to the next reserve period exces8 
reserves or deficiencies up to 2$; ot required reserve changer. Nos. 2 
and 3 are the most important for primary reser"e management. Banks 
now know what their required reserves are at the beginning of the reserve 
per:1od, and they know the portion of RR met by vault cash. 
15 
holding ER. The asset Ez is what has previous~ been called a default 

risk asset, and the market in which E2 is issued and traded is called 

the credit market. The asset, Et plays the role of secondary reserves 

and is a monetary asset which. by previous definition, has no risk of 

detault and is traded in the money market. 

In considering the effects of short-run primar,y reserve adjustment 
on rates in financial markets. the most frequently used alternative 
to ER is assumed to be Fi.' an asset which differs from ER onl,y- in having 
a variable market yield. and an asset which is traded in the money 
Jllarket. In other words. the problem is confined to that of choosing 
between ER on the one hand, and E:1 on the other. both of whicb. are mon­
etary assets. The choice that determines the relative amount of wealth 
. allocated to monetary assets. F1. + TR, and to default risk assets. 
E.2. is abstracted in this discussion.15 Shifts in the relative amount 
ot monetary assets and credit market assets held by banks would cer­
ta1nly affect rates in the tWo markets. BIrt. it is assumed that• 
such shifts take place over longer periods of time than the period 
considered here. Short-term adjustment in primary reserves is the 
employing ot "surplus" primary reserve funds for short periods ot time 
by purchasing assets close~ substitutable tor primar,y reserves, namely, 
15 George Morrison suggests that the bank's demand tor non-earning 
assets should be approached from the general context of the demand 
and supp~ tor each of the principle asset categories in a bankts port­
folio. George Morrison, !h! Liguidity .~efe:r:ence .2! £ommercial Banks 
(Chicago: University of Cldcago Press, 1966J. p. 13. For an optim­
ization model of individual bank portfolio selection, see Willi6Jll 
Russell, "Commercial Bank Porttolio Adjustment. n American Economic 
Review (May. 1964), p. 544. 
16 
earning monetar,y assets. Thus, short-tera adjustment to temporar,y 
"surplus" reserves affect the money market. The reasoning is the same 
for a temporary deficient primary reserve position. Therefore, the 
market in which short-term primary reserve adjustment has its main 
effect is assumed to be the money market. This affords a well defined 
market for observing the effects of primar.y reserve adjustment. 
TD includes demand deposits, savings deposits, and other time 
deposits net of cash items in process of collection. 
The basic assumption with regard to bank behavior is that the 
individual bank will at all times want to maintain some given amount 
of excess reserves. The desired volume of excess reserves is denoted 
Ea., and the barlk's objective in deciding on ER* is to minimize its 
loss from holding excess reserves. Based on. this objactive, there are 
two main arguments in the function which describes ER•• 
The first is the opportunity cost. OC. of holding ER. This is 
expected return that could be gotten by holding E1 rather than ER. 
OC is, in turn, determined by two factors. One is the rate of return 
on El, r, which is known with certainty. As mentioned above, the 
asset, El, which is the alternative of holding F~, is assumed to be 
payable in a fixed amount at maturity and have no risk of default. 
Thus, r could be represented by the current yield to maturity on short­
term secondary reserve assets. 
The other ~eterm1nant of OC is the expected capital gain or loss, 
g, due to a change in r. The variable, g, can be described more pre­
cise~ with a probability distribution whose mean is Mg and whose stand­
ard deviation is Sg_ Assuming banks on the average expect no change in r. 
17 
Mg 0, and Sg remains as a measure ot risk ot capital gain or loss.II: 
Th. larger Sg. the larger the risk associated with any given r. It 
BlOat banks are risk averters16• tor a given r, a rise in Sg will lower 
the expected return to be obtained from investment in Et. Thus, an 
inverse relationship between OC and Sg can be postulated. As will be 
shown later in the paper. Sg can become an important destabilizing 
torce on OC and, thus, on ER* it money market rat.s fluctuate to a 
large extent. This is because rat. movements in the money market 
1nfiuence Sg. 
In contrast to Sg. which is a variable describing expected risk 

ot capital gain or loss. Mg is a measure of either expected gain or 

expected capital loss. The more positive Mg is. the bigher is the 

. expected gain and the higher is. oc.. The more, neg.at1v.a" rig is, the higher' 
is the expected capital loss and the lover is OC. There is a direct 
relationship between Mg and OC. 
To summarize the determinats ot OC, the following relationship 
can be used: 

~ =F Cr. Kg. Sg) (5) 

~.r+Mg-Sg (6) 

16 Professor Tobin defines a risk avener as one who n •••will 
not be satisf'i'e.d to accept more risk unless they can also expect 
greater expected return." They are in contrast to the risk lovers 
who " ••• are willing to accept lower expected return in order to have 
the chance ot unusually high capital gains••• 11 James Tobin, ilLiquidity 
Preterence as Behavior Towards Risk." Review of Economic studies 
(February. 1958). p. 73. As a group. banks are-more likely to be 
risk-averters. partly because ot the liquidity of their liabilities 
compared to their assets. and partly because of the complex of laws 
and governmental authority restraining their activities and shaping 
their attitud.s. 
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In (6). the signs are used to show the direction or the relationship. 
The subscript i denotes that this is a function tor an individual bank. 
The other major argument in the function explaining Ea. is the 
expected cost of a reserve drain that results in a reserve deficiency 
(ER le8s than 0). This will be denoted ECD. It also has two deter­
Id..na:nts. The first is the penalty cost17 n, per dollar of reserve 
deticienq. This is usually known in advance with certainty.18 The 
actual size of n depends on how the deticienc.y is covered. Here it 
is usetu1 to distinguish two methods ot adjustment-borrowing from the 
Federal Reserve Banks and the use of an adjustment instrument whose 
rate is determined in the money market. The latter method would in­
clude the sale of short-term U. S. Government securities and the purchase 
of Federal funds. If n is a market determined rate, its valu. at the 
beginning of a reserve period would not be known with as much certainty 
a8 if the appropriate n were the discount rate. It the deficiency is 
to be met by selling (reducing) Et, n would be the yield on El plus 
the capital gain or loss trom selling F1.. The yield on Et would be 
known with certainty, but the capital gain or loss would not be known 
for sure until the asset is sold. It the deficiency is met by purchas­
ing Federal funds, the penalty rate would be the rate paid on Federal 
hnd. and would not hi known with certainty. In other words. the value 
of n i8 more uncertain it the method of adjustment has a market deter­
mined rate rather than an administered rate. In a later section all 
17 The term penalty cost is used in this context by Morrison, 
OPe cit•• p. 9. 
18 As long as the bank knows it can cover the deficienc,y by borrow­
ing trom the Federal Reserve and is willing to do so, it would be certain 
that at most n would equal the discount rate. 
19 
_thods ot adjustment with a market determined rate are grouped into a 
single alternative to borrowing trom the Federal Reserve Bank.19 
The other determinant of ECD is expectations regarding a reserve 
drain greater than ER. This will be denoted by f. The variable t 
can be specified using a probabil1~ distribution ot expected reserve 
flows with a mean of Nt and a standard deviation of St. It Mt =0 
reserve rlows on average are not expected to change ER, but that this 
will in fact happen is more risky the greater Sr. Thus. Sf becomes 
a measurement ot uncertainty about future reserve flows. The greater 
the uncertainty about reserve flow, the greater the unexpected cost ot 
reserve deticienc,y_ The relationship between st and ECD is direot. 
When Mf is positive, the bank on average expects a reserve inflow. 
When Nt is negative, a reserve loss is expected. The relationship 
between Nt and ECD is an inverse one. The higher the arithmetic value 
ot Mt. the lower ECD and vice versa. 
To summarize the determinants ot ECD, the tollowing relationship 
can be written: 
ECD =G (n, Mr' St) (7) 
ECD=n+Sr-Ht (8) 
In (8), the signs indicate the direction of the relationship. 
19 This discussion has not included the administrative or 
transaction costs ot meeting a reserve deficiene.y. It is assumed here 
that they are constant over time and. theretore , are not responsible 
tor any change in n. For an example ot including administrative costs 
in a reserve adjustment model, see D. Orr and W. Mellon, "stochastic 
Reserve Losses and EXpansion of Bank Credit," American F.eonomic Review 
(September. 1961), p. 614. 
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The above two arguments make up the demand function tor excess 
reNrves as tollows: 
ERt =lit (ECD.1.. OCi ) 
ERr = ECDi - ex;. 
ER! • (~ - Sti - Hri) - (ri ­ \i - Sgi) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
'lbe signs in (10) and (11) show the direction ot the relationship. 
The demand tor excess reserves qy the entire banking s,yste. is the sum 
ot the excess reserves demand for each individual bank and will be shown 
as: 
EIl* • H (ECD. OC) (12) 
Ell· = ECD - OC (13) 
ER* = (n - St - Mf) - (r - ~ - Sg) (14) 
Ea* = Desired..holding"s,ot exc&S8 reeM"V'tt&. 
BCD =Expected cost ot a reserve dericienc,y. 
n:= Penalty cost per dollar ot reserve deticienc,y. 
Kr • Mean ot expectations about volume ot reserve flows. 
Sf IF standard deviation of expectations about volume ot 
reserve now. 
OC = Cpportuntty cost ot holding excess reserves. 
r =Rate ot return on earning assets. 
Kg = Average ot expectations about changes in r. 
Sg = standard deviation of expectations regarding changes 
in r. 
The sign in the ER. torllllllation indicates the direction ot the 
relationships. but the magnitude ot the various relationships are not 
known. A rise in OC (ceteris paribus) would lower ER•• and a lowering 
in OC would riae Eft.. A rise in RCD (ceteris paribus) would raise ER•• 
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and a lowering of ECD would lower Ea.. However, the elasticity of Ea· 
with respect to OC and KCD is not known. .Also (12) does not say an;v­
thing about the form (i.e•• linear or non-linear) ot the Ea· function. 
Both the form of the functions and the elasticity coefficients of the 
variables are matters to be solved by empirical investigation. 
This demand for excess reserve formulation is at the base of 
banking systelll reserve lIlS.lUIIgement behanor, and it rests squarely on 
the assumption that reserves are managed with the intention of ~ 
mising losses from holding excess reserves. A factor common to both 
arguments explaining ER. is the existence of uncertainty.20 Uncer­
tainty complicates the problem of reserve management. It makes banks 
balance the gain trom use of reserves against the unforeseeable possi­
bility that they ma;y incur a reserve deficiency: o.o..st. 
ibe two arguments in the ER. formulation can be used to demonstrate 
the two hypotheses set forth to explain the large volumes of excess 
reserves during the 19301 s. The liquidity trap hypothesis says a 
low OC was responsible for the high ER.. The shitt-1n-liquidity 
preference hypothesis says a high ECD (and in particular, a negative 
Mt and high Sf), is the proper explanation of the large excess reserves. 21 
20 "With complete certainty no excess reserves would be held,lI ~. 
p. 616. This reasoning assumes zero rate of return of ER. Kareken 
presents a model in which ER* is determined by the rate of return on 
reserves and loans, and the rate paid on deponts. John H. Kareken. 
"Comerc1al Banks and the SUpply of Money." .Federal Reserve Bulletin, 
October, 1967. p. 1699. Tobin suggests the payment-of interest on 
exoess reserves -to make the opportunity cost holding excess reserves 
controllable according to Central Banic discretion. James Tobin, "Toward 
Improrlng the Efficiency of the Monetary Mechanism, II Review E! Economics 
.e9. .-st.-&....t..i;;;;.st.-i...c;,,;;.s, August, 1960, p. 276. 
21Horrison, Ope cit., explores this alternative empirically and 
gives reasons for the plausibility of a shift in liquidity preference. 
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What determ1riants of Ea. have not been explicit~ included? The 
tollowing factors could certainl.y influence the demand for excess 
res.rves, but they do not show up explicitly in the above Ea. function. 
1. The deposit mix. 
2. The earning asset mix. 

). Th. economic and geographicaldiversitication ot depositors. 

4. The size ot the bank. 
5. The bank's desire to accommodate customer loan demand. 
Th. above Ea. function does account for these factors implicitly. 
That is. their influence is reflected in the explicit arguments of 
the function. For example, the deposit mix would reflect itself 
in S:r and Kg. Diversification of depositors would also show up 
througb. .. expected, r~flow. Th.....faotor&·h~thftr impact on 
Ea· via the expliCit variables in (12). Since OC and EeD are hard 
to quantify tor ellpirica1 work, directly observable factors such as 
deposit mix and bank size might be used to approximate the main 
arguments in the Ea. function. 
ll. THE SUPPLY OF ER TO THE BANKING SYSTEM 
The previous section developed the arguments in the demand 
tor excess reserves. The actual stock of excess reserves is: 
ER = TR - RR 
fR (total reser.ves supplied to the banking system) is formulated 
elsowhere in this paper. Given the total deposits subject to 
reserve requirements and the legal reserve ratio, RR at any time is 
2,3 

known. 22 The actual &IIlount of excess reserves available to the 
banking system is jointl3' deterad.ned by banking system required 
reserves and central bank: suppl3' ot reserves to the banking system. 
III. HEED FOR RESERVE ADJUSTMENT AND METHODS OF ADJUSTMENT 
Ddsequilibrium between the actual stock of excess reserves and 
the desired stock of excess reserves is the condition needed for 
primar,y reserve adjustment. It sets the reserve adjustment process 
in motion. The need tor reserve adjustment can be shown as: 
Ea. I: ER 
If ER is greater than ER•• the banking system will be attempting to 
lower ER by' increasing their holdings of E1. To the extent the 
b&nk~M system..1ncreasu itsbold:2..:cg.-. ot. Ett deposits are-sp&flEieci 
and a rise in RR reduces ER toward ER.. If· ER is less than ER., the 
banking s,ystem will be trying to increase ER by sell1ng Et. To the 
extent they sell E1 to the non-bank sector deposits are lowered and 
so are RR. TIns raises ER toward ER*. 
In addition to this stock disequilibrium, there is a second 
demension to the primary reserve adjustment process. This is the 
relationship of the distance between desired excess reserves and 
actual excess reserves, (Ea. - ER). to the bank's effort to restore 
equality between Ea. and ER.23 The asswnption is that the desired 
22 Eecause' of the changes in reserve computation (referred to in 
footnote 15), RR and the currency portion of TR are known at the begin­
ning or the reserve period. This makes ER easier to estimate and their 
actual value known sooner than before. 
2,3 This aspect ot bank behavior is sldl.l.tully sbown by .Meigs, 
OPe cit., espec1aJ.ly pp. 49-53. 
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rates at which banks approach a new equilibrium. is an increasing 
tIlnction of the spread between ER. and ER: 
dERb = J (ER· - ml) 
CIt 
The subscript b denotes that this is a change in ER at the initiative 
of the banking system. The turther banks are out of equilibrium with 
respect to their excess reserve positions, the greater will be their 
etforts to equate ER. and ER. Thus. for any given excess reserve dis­
equilibrium, say (ER. - ERo)' there will be a rate at which banks are 
tr;ving to change th.eir actUal. holdings of ER. ( d:nl'); and this inc­
reases the greater (ER. - ER). It can be seen that the greater m. - Ea, 
the greater the use of available methods of adjustment by the banking 
system. That is. the greater will the banking system participate as 
a net supplier or net demander of E1 assets. 
Two _thods of adjustment will be used for ana.lyzing the effects 
ot primary reserve disequilibrium on the money market and on the stock 
of primary reserves available to the banking system.. The first is 
the sale or purchase of Et in the money market. The.. include purchase 
and sale ot Federal funds, purchase and sale of short-term Treasury 
securities, etc. The second is a change in the level of borrowing from. 
the Federal Reserve Banks. The first method would have an impact on 
rates in the money market, whereas the second would change the stock 
ot primary reserves available to the banking system. 
A fiDal aspect of the reserve adjustment process is the influence 
ot Federal Reserve open market sales and purchases on the banks· attempt 
to achieve equilibrium in ER* and Eft. For &D7 given d~, open 
lIl4rket operations can be changing the actual Eft by a like amount in 
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the opposite direction, and Federal Reserve policy would be just 
otfsetting the banking system attempts to reconcile Ea. and ER.24 
dERF dERJ,Federal Reserve Policy actions will be denoted IH. If' (IE"'" , actual 
Eft w:lll not change and bank influence on the money market will be negated 
by Federal Reserve Policy. Thererore, to observe the influence or 
banks on the money ma.rket, the influence or the Federal ReMrve must 
be held constant. 
Thi. chapter has described the primar,y reserve adjustcent process. 
Berore determining how this adjustment process arrects rates in the 
money market and how central bank lending can influence these errect. 
on the money market, the determinants or the actual volume or borrowing 
trom the central bank must be examined. 
24 Meigs, op. cit., r.rers to this as a secondary equilibrium. 
He uses this concep~ show that ir a constant rre6 reserve position
is a secondary equilibrium, the Federal Reserve is not holding its 
influence constant. 
CHAPTER V 
THE DETERMINANTS OF BORRaNED RESERVES 
Most theoretical work on the role of central bank lending in the 
monetary process assumes that the amount of reserves available to member 
banks at the discount window is perfectly elastic at the prevailing 
discount rate. This has been directly stated by Dewald: "Though 
each Reserve Bank administers discounting as it interprets the governing 
regulation. the fact is that borrowers are almost alw~s accommodated 
with no question asked.,,25 Also, !1.onhallon and Parthemos, both officers 
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, state: "•••Reserve Bank admin­
istration of the discount window seldom if ever involves any outright 
refusals of accommodations to particular applicants ••• Hence it is 
reasonable to consider that the supply of discount accommodation at 
any time is perfectly elastic at th~ going discount rate ••• ,,26 This 
idea of perfectly elastic supply of reserves at the discount window 
is also implied by studies which approach the determinates of member 
banks borrowing from the Federal Reserve solely by analyzing the demand 
function for such borrowing.27 
25 William G. Dewald, .2E:...2lli.. p. 142. 
26 Jimmie R. Monhollon and James Parthemos, "Administering of 
the Discount FUnction: A Comment~ National Banking Review (September, 
1966). p. 92. 
'l:l Murr~ E. Polakoff, "Reluctance Elasticityt least Cost and 
Member-Bank Borrowing," The Journa.l of Finance (Ha.rch, 1960), '0. 1; 
stephan M. Go1dfeld and EdWard J. K'a.ne. "The Determinants of M~mber 
Bank Borrowing: .An Economic Study", Journal of Finance (September, 1966) 
p.~. ­
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Federal Reserve Regulation and Statute interpretation regarding 
the proper use of borrowing, including the forward to Regulation A 
made effective in 1955.28 and the present Committee Report, should 
point up the possibility of supply conditions which are not perfectly 
elastic at the discount rate. SUch supp~ conditions could pl~ a 
formidable role in determining. the amount of borrowing at ~ time. 
It is the purpose of this section to show that the amount of borrowing 
from the Federal Reserve is simultaneously set by both the demand 
fUnction for borrowing (a behavioral pattern on the part of banks) 
and the supply conditions at the discount window (set by the Federal 
Reserve Banks as monopoly suppliers). This will be done by separating 
the influences on borrowing which come from the demand,function from 
tboae...which are· derived from supply coruU:tion8-'. Too often the-- supply 
conditions which have nothing to do with member banks' demand function 
are used as arguments in the demand fUnction for borrowing.29 It is 
ver,y important that the influences from the supply side be kept separate 
from those on the demand side if the effect of a change in supply con­
d1tions is to be properly assessed. For example, the discount mechanism 
changes proposed in the Committee Report are changes in supply conditions. 
There is no reason to believe that they will in any way change the demand 
function for borrowing on the part of banks. However, the new supply 
conditions may very well change the quantity of borrowed reserves 
28 "Regulation A: Advances and Discounts by Federal Reserve Banks, 11 
Federal Reserve Bulletin (January, 1955). pp. 8-14. 
29 O:le example is the following by Honhollon and Partbemos, 
..2E!.,ill,:., p. 92: "••• discount administration affects the quantity 
of borrowing through its effects on the demand for such accommodation .. " 
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demanded at any given time. The supply conditions for reserves at the 
discount window will be developed tirst. 
I. THE SUPPLY OF BORRONED RESERVES 
Can an aggregate supply function tor reserves at the discount 
window be postulated from the proposa.ls in the Committee Report? 
Before attempting to formulate supply conditions, the present guide.. 
lines for administering the discount window need to be examined 
briefly. 
There are two ways by .which the Federal Reserve can influence the 
volume ot borrowing at the discount window. One is by manipulation 
of the discount rate. The other is the way in which the Federal Reserve 
'BItrdts- define condit±ons or- eligibility. rus definition or eligibility 
for member bank borrowing is usually referred to as the administration 
ot the discount function. 30 Thus, tor any given discount rate, supply 
conditions at the discount window are determined by the administration 
ot the discount function. Regulation A, which gives broad guidelines 
tor discount administration, provi.des that "the continuous use of 
Federal Reserve Credit by a member bank over a considerable period of 
time is not regarded as appropriate. ,,31 This can presumably be turned 
30 David L. Lapkin and Ralph W'. prouts, "The Administration ot 
the Discount Window, II National Banki!!! Review (December, 1965), 
p. 179. 
31 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Advan~es 
~ Discounts ~ Fede~ Reserve Banks, ReKR1ation !., p. 1, Federal 
Reserve Bulletin (JaJ'luary,1955j, p. 15. 
29 
around and couched in supply terms by saying that continuous lending 
to a single member bank b,y a Federal Reserve Bank is not considered 
appropriate. The 1955 forward to Regulation A gives some specific 
cases of appropriate and inappropriate lending by the central bank. 
The appropriate reasons for lending are to assist a bank in: (1 ) 
unexpected temporary need of funds, (2) seasonal needs of funds which 
cannot reasonabl.Y be met trom the banks own resources, and (3) unusual 
or emergency situations. Inappropriate lending includes: (1) lending 
to a single bank on a continuous basis, (2) lending to a bank so that 
it can earn a rate differential, (3) lending to a bank so that it can 
obtain a tax advantage,32 and (4) lending to facilitate speculation.)) 
The criterion of continuous borrowing has emerged as the most practical 
i.l,lidellne for admin1.stering. the discount.,window.. Guidelines· in the· 
form of collateral eligibility requirements. which were supposed to 
restrict central bank lending to productive uses fell into disuse after 
the fallacies of the real-bills doctrine were exposed. 34 other criteria 
)2 This apparently refers to a situation which lasted from 1951 
to 1954 under which banks could reduce their liability on the excess 
profits tax by borrOwing from the Federal Reserve. SUch borrowing 
was included in the capital base against which actual profits were 
compared to get the profit percentage. The smaller the percentage, 
the lower the excess profits tax. 
33 "Forward to Regulation A," Federal Reserve Bulletin (January, 
1955), pp. 8-14. 
34 George W. McKinney, The Federal Reserve Discount Window (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 19bO). See Chapter 6 for an 
an~sis of the rise and fall of the eligibility requirements concept. 
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tor discount administration (i.e., those listed under the appropriate 
and inappropriate uses of borrowing) are almost impossible to determine. 
For example, lending to a bank for a use which is not speculative may 
tree other funds of the bank for speculative use. This would be imposs­
ible to determine when making the loan. Apart from the practical 
problems of the other criteria for discount ~~stration, a basic 
reason for using the continuity criterion is that appropriate situations 
tor central bank lending can be readily defined in terms of the length 
ot time a bank has been in.continuous dept to the Federal Reserve. 

Barring the extreme circumstances of an emergency" the central bank 

. i5 only to lend to a bank on a short-term and seasonal basis to help 

meet temporary needs for funds. Whether or not the use of borrowing 
. was tor temsoorU':Y'need'S" could be adjudged on the basis of the continuous 
nature of the borrowing. Federal Reserve lending Cor a continuous period 
oC time could be used as evidence that the borrowed. reserves are not 
being used for temporary short-run purposes. 
Although the extent of continuity in lending to a single bank 
has emerged as criterion for administering the discount function, the 
vagueness of the work flcontinuous" has remained a problem. Different 
interpretations can result in differences in discount administration 
among the twelve Federal Reserve banks35 and over time. The proposals 
contained in the Committee Report are aimed at specifying (and quantify­
ing) the meaning of the continuous borrowing criterion of discount 
administration. Three different situations for appropriate central 
35 This possibility is the subject of the Lapkin and Pfouts article f 
~ Eh They conclude: "The faetual evidence is not compatible••• 
with uniform administration of the discount function, II p. 186. 
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bank lending are outlined. These are lending to a bank for short-term 
adjustment need, lending for seasonal accommodation, and lending for 
emergency assistance. The last two situations will not be included 
in the following analysis on the grounds that to the extent such lending 
situations may arise, they will be a nominal amount in relation to 
total central bank lending. Also, their behavior can be expected to be 
constrained by the same specific criteria as central bank lending for 
short-term needs, although the aotual outer limits in emergenoies and 
seasonal lending would be larger. 
ijv tar the most important feature of the Committee Report for 
shaping central bank lending oonditions is the "basic borrowing 
prl.vilege, tI which is meant to tultill the short-term needs of a bank. 
This. concept sata, spe.ci.£ic .. l1mits on the &mQunt ot reserv&& a- ba.nki 
can borrowtrolll Fed. per unit of time. In effect it gives specific 
meaning to the "oontinuous borrowing" criterion of discount adminis­
tration. In devising a general definition of continuous borrowing. 
two questions arise: (1) What is the appropriate time unit of 
concern? (2) What is the critical duration beyond whioh borrowing 
becomes continuous?J6 The Committee Report takes a reserve period 
(now one week) as the proper time unit for expressing a state of borrow­
ing. Since required reserves are speoified in average of daily 
balanoes, borrowing at any time during a single reserve period is 
essentially par~ of the same operation. 
The critical number of reserve periods beyond which borrowing 
36 Jack L. Cooper. "Continuous Borrowir.g From the Federal Reserve 
System: Some Empirical F.vidence,1t Journal of Finance (Maroh, 19(9), p. JJ. 
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becomes continuous is set at half thE;) reserve periods out of a siX 
month period. Thus, the proposal wants the base period (half of 
which can be made up ot reserve periods that contain borrowing) to 
be six months in length. In setting these limits. the Committee's 
objective was to fulfill the short~term adjustment needs of the 
individual banks. In the words of the Committee Report: 
"The recommended operational objective is for 
temporary credit accommodation to be extended 
over a long enough period of time to cushion 
short.term fluctuations and permit orderlY ad. 
justment to longer-term movements but not for 
so long as to invite procrastination in the 
making ot needed adjustments by individual 
borrowing banks or to delay unduly the response 
ot the banking system to a change in general 
monetary policy,n3? 
In addition to the time limit which detines contiriuous borrow­
ing, the Committee Report sets dollar limits tha.t the Reserve bank 
will lend to a member as long as the limits of continuous lending 
have not been violated. The limits tor each bank are to be based 
on the banks capital and surp1us--the relative amount of basic 
borrowing privilege declining as capital and surplus become larger 
(i.e., the limit would be 20-40~ the first $1 million ot capital 
and surplus; 10-20~ ot amounts between $1 million and $10 million, 
and 10;£ of ca.pita1 and surplus in excess ot $10 million). Again, 
these tigures are picked because they are thought to be large enough 
to meet the short-term adjustment needs ot individual banks. 
Whether or not these quantitative limits on the continuity and 
absolute amount ot lending to a single bank are too large or too small 
37 ••• :Report of a System Committee, .2E,• .ill., p. 8. 
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is not the problem. here. The question is, how do these kinds of 881£­
imposed central bank lending restraints aftect the aggregate supplY 
conditions for primar,y reserves at the discount window? Reserves 
available to the individual bank at the discount window are limited 
from the supplY side mainlY by the amount the central bank has already 
lent to the individual bank under consideration.)8 That is, borrowed 
reserves supplied to a single bank are a decreasing function of the 
number of reserve periods the bank has already been in debt to the 
Federal Reserve: 
P1 == f (~ of last 26 reserve p&riods in debt) 
~ ••• <SO 
Onder present proposals, borrowed reserves would be supplied until 
theL bank. had borrowed in thirteen of the-laat twenty-six-r~ 
periods. Aftel" this, the supply of reserves at the discount window 
would be cut off. 
The need is to convert this into a supply relationship which makes 
the reserves supplied at the discount window a function of their 
effective cost. To do this. an important assumption must be made, 
namelY that discount administration as described above causes the 
effective cost of borrowed reserves to rise as more reserves are 
supplied to the bank at the discount window. This assumption rt.JB.Y be 
justified by the notion that the more a bank borrows tod~, the less 
it will be allowed to borrow in the future; lower borrowing power 
_ )8 The withdrawal of a borrowing request is interpreted as a 
restraint from the supplY side when it is occasioned by a flat re 
fusal to lend by the central bank, or when the bank is persuaded 
not to make the request. by the central bank. 
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in the future may require the bank to hold larger excess reserves in 
the future (which involves a direct cost) than would otherwise be the 
39case. Such a supply function for a single bank could be shown as 
rollews: 
R; =F(rd + c) 
RI =Reserves supplied to an individual bank at the discount 
window. 
rd = Discount rate. 
c =Cost factor which increases as the percent of the last 
26 reserve periods in debt increases toward 50%. This 
is a cost factor which increases as future borrowing 
potential decreases. 
This function says that if a ballk is willing to pay a higher effective 
cost tor borrowed reserves, it can obtain more reserves at the discount 
t4.ndow •. 
The relationship is derived directly from the supply conditions 
proposed for the discount window. These supply conditions raise the 
effective cost of borrowed reserves to a bank as the frequenC,Y of 
recent borrowing increases because they lower a bank's future borrow­
ing potential and this, in turn, raises the amount of future excess 
reserves a bank will need relative to the amount they would need 
had their future borrowing capabilities remained unchanged. Such 
a rise in the ne8d for excess reserves in the future increases the 
effective cost of borrowing from the Federal Reserve. 
As an extreme example suppose a bank has borrowed from the Federal 
39 William Poole, "Commercial Bank Reserve Management in a 
stochastic Model: Implications for Monetary PoliC,Y", Journal 2!. 
Finance (December, 19(8), p. 785. 
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Reserve in 12 of the last 26 reserve periods (weeks). If it borrows 
in the present reserve period it cannot borrow in the following 
reserve period. ~ borrowing in the present reserve period the 
bank is creating the need for greater excess reserves next week. 
This is a cost of borrowing during the present reserve period. The 
assumption is that if a bank has no discounting capabilities it is 
going to hold greater excess reserves than if it has the capability 
to borrow from Fed. Why would smaller f'uture discounting capabilities 
raise f'uture ER*? Lower ~ure discounting potential would raise the 
expected cost of a reserve deficiency in two ways. First lower f'uture 
borrowing capabilities would restrict the means of reserve adjustment 
to market instruments. The penalty cost, n, tor market instruments 
0£.. addus:tment. is. more unce~_. other. thing.s., equaJ., a ris. in URCEtF­
ta1nty regarding n would raise the expected cost of a reserve deficienqy. 
Second, if the discount rate were below the rates on market instru­
ments of adjustment, lower f'uture borrowing capabilities would raise 
the cost per dollar of f'uture reserve deficiencies. 
There is a problem in generalizing the supply function (~). 
In the case of the single bank, it can be seen that an increase in 
borrowing from the Federal Reserve would mena a higher effective cost 
to the bank becanse of lower f'uture borrowing capability and greater 
need for excess reserves. But, in the f'uture, increased lending by 
Fed. does not have to mean increased effective cost of borrowed re­
serves to all banks. For banks who have not as yet used the discount 
window (say t in the last six months) t there is no increase in the 
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effective cost of borrowed reserves. Thus, an increase in the supply 
of borrowed reserves to the banking system does not mean an increase 
in effective cost to all banks-only to banks that are increas_ing their 
borrowings. But, a higher volume of borrowing does mean a rise in the 
average effective cost of obtaining funds at the discount window. 
Whether an increase in system borrowing comes from a bank that has not 
previously borrowed (say, for 15ix months) or from a bank that has a 
recent borrowing record, their effective cost of borrowing has increased 
and this raises the average effective cost for all banks as a result 
of the increase in supply of reserves at the discount window. It is 
possible that a bank with a low effective cost of borrowing would borrow 
from the Federal Reserve and lend Federal funds to the bank which has 
Su.ch 
tendencies would work to equalize the effective cost of borrowing from 
the Federal Reserve among all banks. Therefore, the supply of borrowed 
primary reserves to the banking s.ystem is seen as a function under which 
the Federal Reserve b,y its discount administration practices can force 
an increase in effective cost of borrowing as more borrowed reserves 
are supplied. The Quantity of borrowed reserves supplied to the bank­
ing system is an increasing function of the average effective dost 
of borrowing. 
~ =F(CB); ~ = the average effective cost of borrowing 
for the banking system. 
This supply function together with the demand function for 
borrowed reserves determines the actual behavior of borrowed reserves. 
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II. THE DElI.A.~D FUNCTION FOR BORROWED REStt-:RVES 
The demand for borrowed reserves has received more attention as 
a determinant of borrowing behavior than have supp~ conditions. This 
is probably because of the key role assigned to it by ear~ theories 
of central banking. In Riefler1s reserve position theor.y of monetary 
control, the borrowed reserves demand function is the avenue by which 
open market operations influence commercial bank behavior. 4O He 
argued that the demand for borrowed reserves was a stable function of 
the banking s,ystems total reserves, regardless of profit opportunities 
for borrowing. Bank behavior couJ.d be influenced by changing the 
actual reserve position of banks, ~, from their desired reserve position 
:.• BR is borrowed reserves of the banking system, and TR is total 
BR 
reserves. The Federal Reserve could raise ~by selling securities 
in the open market, since banks would be forced at first to borrow 
ER to restore reserves lost through open market operations. With ~ 
greater than~, banks would restrict lending so they could reduce 
their borrowed reserves to the desired level. In other words, open 
market operations had the affect of changing the actual level of 
borrowings, and the lending behavior of member banks is closely linked 
to the amount of their indebtedness to the central bank. The proof 
of this link was said to be the close relation shown by the volume 
of borrowing and market interest rates. This reserve position doctrine 
40 Winfield W. Riefler, Money Rates and Money Markets in the 
United states (New York: Harper and Bros., 1930). 
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of monetary control was given additional support by W. R. Burgess41 
and later formed the 	foundation of the free reserve conception of 
42the monetar,y prooess. 
What is of interest here is the particular demand funotion for 
borrowed reserves which is of critical importance to the reserve 
position theory. A vital link in reserve position theory was the so­
called tradition against borrowing on the part of oommercial banks. 
This was founded on experienoe with finanoial oonditions which 
existed prior to the Federal Reserve S,ystem. In early finanoial 
panios, a bank that depended heavily on borrowing would see its funds 
dr.Y up and be the first to fail. Also. the existenoe of borrowing 
became generally regarded as a oonfession of weakened finanoial 
condition and poor management. 43 The tradition ~st borr..ow:ing. was. 
felt to be so strong that banks were also reluotant to borrow from the 
Federal Reserve. This reluotanoe to borrow was believed to be the dom.­
inant factor in the borrowed-reserve demand funotion. It is a basic 
tenent in reserve position theory that the amount of borrowed reserves 
demanded is a stable function of total reserves beoause of this relue­
tanoe motive in the deoision to borrow. That is. banks will borrow 
only when they are foroed into it by a "need" and will try to reduoe 
41 W. R. Burgess, The Reserve Banks and the Money Market. rev. 
ad. (New York: Harper and Bros., 1936). -­
42 Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer, The Federal Reserve's 
Attachment ~ the ~ Reserve Concept: A "§'taff Analy;sis. U. S. 
House of Representatives Banking ~,d Currenoy Committee (Washington, 
D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Offioe, 1964). 	 " 
4) Murray F.. Polakoff f uFederal Reserve Disoount Policy and 
Its Critios," Banking and Honetary ~udies, ed. Deane Carson 
(Homewood, Illinois, 1963), p. 193. 
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their level of borrowing as soon as possible. Thus, a demand function 
based on reluctance was a necessary link in the reserve position theory 
of monetary control. 
Today, when bank panics are much less a factor. the reluctance 
motive is still regarded by many as the dominant force behind the 
demand function for borrowed reserves. The reason for this is a body 
ot empirical work which shows a poor relationship between the spread 
of the market rates and the discount rate, and the actual quantity 
of borrowed reserves. Since an increase in the spread between market 
rates over the discount rate would mean greater profit incentive to 
borrow, a lack of actual increase in borrowing under these circumstances 
is interpreted to mean the reluctance mo:tive in the borrowed reserve 
fl;u:).c:U.on is the dominant one-. ProfEtssor Polakoff has-.-formalizM a 
44reluctance theory of the demand function for borrowed reserves.
The marginal rate of disutility from being in debt to the Federal 
Reserve rises at an increasing rate as the amount of debt increases. 
Batt at the same time. the marginal utility trom profit is only raising 
at a constant rate as borl'owing increases. For any profit spread 
between market rates and the discount rate there would be an amount 
of borrowing which, if increased, would increase disutility greater 
than it would increase profit. The greater the profit spread, the 
greater this critical amount of borrowing. But Professor Polakoff 
believes that at relatively low amounts of borrowing disutility from 
borrowing is increasing at such a rapid rate that an increase in the 
44 Murray E. Polakoff, ItReluctance Elasticity, Least Cost, and 
Member Bank Borrowing," Journal of Finance, (March, 1960), p. 1. 
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profit spread would raise borrowing only ani insignifioant amount or 
none at all. His evidence supporting this reluctanoe theorum is pre­
. sented in the form of a group of scatter diagrams wherein the volume 
of system borrowed reserves is plotted against the profit spread 
between the Treasury Bill rate ~d the disoount rate. The observations 
show a fl&ttening out of total borrowing as profit spreads inorease 
and even in some cases, a deoline in borrowing. 
Not withstanding the evidenoe that the quantity of borrowed 
reserves demanded is not olose~ related to the profit spread between 
the market and disoount rate,45 it is the intention of this section 
to show a demand fUnotion for borrowed reserves which is based sole~ 
on the profit motive. It should be remembered that the demand fUnotion 
is- only one-- determinant of the aotual level of borrowing, and that the 
profit motive is aooepted as the driving foroe in all other oommeroial 
bank behavior. Why should the theoretioal demand funotion for borrowed 
reserves be any different? The partioular phenomenon in the behavior 
of historiea1 levels of borrowing which has been attributed to reluot.. 
&noe on the part of banks, is also oonsistent with a model based on the 
assumption of a profit motive demand funotion and a supply funotion 
of the type previously desoribed. If it were not for the peculiar 
supply oonditions faoing banks, their actual borrowing behavior would 
be free to refleot the profit motive of their demand function. 
45 It should be noted that evidenoe has been presented both for 

and against a profit theory of borrOwing from the Federal Reserve. 

See the work of R. C. Turner. Member Bank Borrow;ns (Columbus, Ohio: 

Ohio state University Press, 1938). ---­
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To the extent reluctance influences the demand function for 
borrowed reserves, it does so through the profit motive. A bankls 
reluctance· to depend on borrowing as a source of funds-because such 
sources may not always be available and may cause future operating 
difficu1ties--e&n be attributed to the bank's desire to MaXimi2e 
long.run profits. Also. reluctance to be indebted to Fed. because 
such is felt to be admission of poor management is based on the desire 
to maximize long-run profits. This form. of reluctance should not 
be confused with reluctance in borrowing behavior which is fostered 
by central bank supply conditions. Demand behavior based on the first 
form of reluctance is actually demand behavior based on the profit 
motive. An additional reason for basing the borrowed reserve demand 
fwlotion on profit maKimizatiolt'behavi'Or is- the fact that banks today 
are not reluctant to borrow in general--witness the growth of the 
Federal FUnds market during recent years. Also, short-term note issues 
became popular sources of short-term funds in 1964 and lasted until 
1966 when the Federal Reserve redefined deposits to include most short­
term note issues for the purpose of Regulation D ("Reserves of Member 
Banks") and Regulation Q (nPayment of Interest on Deposits II ).46 Long­
term debt in the form of capital notes or debentures have been readily 
47used by commercial banks in reoent years. Thus. when reluctance, 
which comes from the demand side, is attributed to the profit motive. 
46 Federal Register, March 29, 1966. 
47 stanley Silverberg, "Bank Borrowing: An A.na.lysis of Recent 
Elcperience." ~!'!tiona+ Ba.nkiE£ Review (December. 1964), p. 213. 
During late 190) and 1964, banks had sold nearly $800 million in 
capital notes or debentures (See Appendix p. 232). 
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the demand function becomes a downward sloping relationship with respect 
to the effective cost of borrowing from the Federal Reserve at aqy 
given set of market rates of interest. At constant market rates of 
interest, the lover the effective cost of borrowing the greater the 
profit incentive to borrov and the greater the quantity of borrowed 
reserves demanded. This effective cost figure would include the dis­
count rate, and the assumed implicit costs of having to hold more ER 
than would otherwise be the case, due to lower futUl·e borrowing poten­
tial, and other administrative transaction costs involved. The banking 
~stem borrowed reserve demand function for ~ given market rate of 
interest is: 
R~ =f (CB) CB =effective cost of borrowed reserves. 
The demand function for borrowed reS8!"V'8e. as shown in this 
section, is based on profit maximization objectives. This is in line 
with other theoretioal formulation of bank behavior (e.g •• reserve 
management theory). Reluctance to borrow, which comes solely from 
the demand side, has been treated as the result of the basic desire 
to maximize profit. While the actual behavior of borrowed reserves 
JIJI1Y show "reluctance behavior, n this is the result of both the demand 
function and supply conditions. This should in no w~ be taken as a 
description of the theoretical demand function for the banking s.ystem. 
The actual shape of this borrowing demand function is not known. 
~ a directional relationship ~ld the factors affecting this relation­
ship is postulated. 
4.3 
nI. THE BEHAVIOR OF BORRGJED RESERVES 
The two previous sections have developed the theoretical supp~ 
and demand functions for borrowed reserves. The supp~ of borrowed 
reserves was shown as an increasing function of their effective cost 
to the banking system at a- given point in time with all other factors 
that influence ~ held constant. The demand for borrowed reserves 
was shown as a decreasing function of the effective cost at a given 
point 1."1 time with all other factors held constant. In this static 
analysis, the actual volume of borrowed reserves and their effective 
cost are simultaneously determined. It is now necessary to relax 
this static analysis and examine the sources of c...i.anges in borrowed 
reserves over time. A change in the actual quantity of borrowed re­
serves demanded would be caused either b,y a shift in the demand function 
or in the supply function, or both. Such shifts occur because the 
factors held constant in static analysis are allowed to vary. 
Shifts in the supply function for borrowed reserves would come 
about by a change in the discount rate or by a change in the method 
or administering the discount window. To the extent the discount 
window is administered with uniformity over time, it would help 
to stabilize the supply function for borrowed reserves. If the 
discount window is administered more freely and banks are allowed 
to borrow for longer periods of time and greater amounts, then at 
~ given volume of borrowing the effective cost would be lower 
than at the previous method of discount administration. An easing 
of discount administration would shift the supply function out, 
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and tightening would shift the supply function back. Administration 
ot the discount window is to be independant of monetary policy.48 
It therefore should not be an important source of instability of the 
supply function. In fact, the quantitative standards proposed in the 
O>mmittee Report should. reduce it as a source of shifts in the supply 
function for borrowed reserves. 
A change in the discount rate would. also cause a shift in the 
supply function. A rise in the discount rate would raise the effective 
cost of borrowed reserves at ever,y level of borrowing, and, by itself, 
would lower the actual quantity of borrowed reserves demanded. A 
lowering of the discount rate would shift the supply functioll out and 
the amount of borrowed reserves demanded would. increase. Thus, a 
lowering of the d'S sconnt rate would, by itself, b& expeeted to ra-ise 
the level of borrowing and vice versa. 
A change in the actual quantity of borrowed reserves outstanding 
could also come about as a result of a shift in the demand function 
for borrowed reserves. The most important shift would be that resulting 
from changes in market rates of interest. For each demand curve, 
the market rate of interest is taken as given. At a constant market 
rate of return, a lowering of the effective cost of borrowed reserves 
will increase the quantity demanded because of the greater profit 
opportunities in borrowing. This gives the borrowed, reserve demand 
function a d~~ard sloping shape. It the market rate of return on 
bank earning assets increases, a greater quantity of borrowed reserves 
- 48 'Professor Whittlesey made this point in his discussion of con­
ceptions regarding discount administration. C. R. Whi.tleseyt "Credit 
Policy of the Discount Window,l1 Quarterly Journal 2.! F.conomics(Y.ay, 1959) 
p. 207. 
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would be demanded at each level of their effective cost. Alternative~, 
at each original level of borrowing. the profit incentive to borrow 
would be widened causing banks to increase their borrowing until the 
effective cost rose high enough to eliminate the profit incentive to 
borrow. Thus, an increase in market rates would shift the demand 
tunction upward and. by itself, increase the volume of borrowed reserves 
outstanding. ether things equal. a decrease in market rates of return 
would lower the amount of borrowed reserves outstanding. 
Using the theoretical demand and supp~ tunction previous~ 
developed in static analysis, the effect of a change in the discount 
rate and in market rates of return on the volume of borrowed reserves 
outstanding have been shown. A rise in the discount would, by itself, 
reduce borrowing and vice versa. A ri.s.e .. in the.. market interest rates­
would raise borrowing, and lower market rates would lower borrowing. 
Thus, movements in the same direction by these two variables have 
opposite effects on actual borrowing behavior. The effect of these 
two rates on borrowed reserves can be put another way: A rise in 
market rates relative to the discount rate would increase borrowed 
reserves. A decline in market rates relative to the discount rate 
would be expected to reduce borrowing. Row much actual borrowing 
responds to such rate movements depends on the elasticities of the 
supply and demand tunctions. The actual shapes of the supp~ and 
demand functions are not known. ~ directional relationships and 
the factors affecting these relationships are postulated. This, however, 
is enough to suggest how actual borrowed reserves will behave during 
the primar,y reserve adjustment process. The effects of borrowing 
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from the central bank on money market rates and on the supply of 
reserves to the banking system will now be discussed. 
CHAPTER VI 

THE EFFECT OF CENTRAL BANK LENDING ON THE 'lVO OBJECTIVES 

OF DISCOUNT REFORM 

Up to now, this paper has developed theoretical tools for use 
in understanding how member bank borrowing from the Federal Reserve 
will affect rates in the money market and the supply of reserves to 
the banking system. First, a model of the primary reserve supply 
process was developed and the conditions stated by which borrowed re. 
serves will improve monetary control. Second, the primary reserve 
adjustment process was formulated. In part three, the determinants 
of borrowed reserveS',' wer ... -sftOWll with sperial emphasis otr how market 
rates of interest and the discount rate affect the quantity of borrow. 
ed reserves demanded. In this part, these tools will be used to 
identif.y the probable effects of central bank lending on the two 
objectives of discount reform. To do this. the relation of the 
reserve adjustment process to the money market must be developed. 
From this, the effect of central bank lending on money market rates 
can be seen. Also, implications for monetary control will be studied. 
I. RELA.TIONSH]l) OF THE RESERVE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS TO THE MONEY lI.ARKET 
Two concepts were developed in describing the reserve adjustment 
process. One is the need for banking system reserve adjustment signi­
fied by disequilibrium between ER and ER*. The other is the rate at 
which the banking system is trying to correct differences in F.R and 
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Ea.. The assumption is that the greater the difference between ER and 
Ea., the faster banks are attempting to achieve equilibrium. How do 
these two factors in the reserve adjustment process affect the money 
market? 
In attempting to determine the effect of the banking s,ystem 
reserve adjustment on the money market, we must assume in this analysis 
that all other participants in the money market are holding their effects 
constant. This includes the Federal Reserve. In such a controlled 
experiment, any rate change in the market is a rate change caused by 
bank adjustment. 
In Chapter IV, the methods of banking primary reserve adjustments 
vere grouped into two categories: (1) changes in the amount of borrow­
ing from the Federal Reserve, and (2) buying and selling earning monetary 
assets (Ej,). The former changes excess reserves (1m) by changing total 
reserves (Ta), while the latter changes ER by changing required reserves 
(RR). Assuming no borrowing from the Federal Reserve (this assump­
tion will be dropped later when the effect of central bank lending 
on money market instability is considered), all methods of adjustment 
can be combined into the demand for and supp~ of one single 
reserve adjustment instrument, and the market for this instrument is 
called the money market. Banks in the system having ER greater than 
ER. have "surplus" excess reserves, and banks that have ER less than 
ER. have "defi<::ient" excess reserves. 49 Any "surplus" is expressed 
49 This concept of "surplus" and "deficienttt excess reserves is 
used by ~xnner and Meltzer to describe a condition of monetary 
expansion or contraction. See Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer, 
~ Alternative A~roach to ~ Monet~ Mechanism, U.S. House of 
Representatives nking and Currency.Committee (washington D. C.: 
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1964.) 
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as a demand for the reserve adjustment instrument. A. "deficient" 
excess reserve position is expressed as a supp~ of the reserve ad­
justment instrument. 
Can the money market rate (single adjustment instrument rate) 
change because or individual bank adjustments: when the aggregate 
Ea. =1m, (i. e., when the banking system is in equilibrium with respect 
to the holding of excess reserves)? The answer is no. Some individual 
banks will have "surplus" excess reserves and some will have "deficient" 
excess reserves based on their individual ER. and ER relationships. 
!:Ut, for all banks, "surplus" excess reserves will be zero. When 
aggregate ER. =ER, individual bank reserve deficiencies add to the 
supp~ of this market in the same amount that individual reserve 
surpluses add to the demand. Bank reserve ad1ustments as a whole are 
contributing to the supp~ in the money market in the same amount as 
they are contributing to the demand, and, therefore, primary reserve 
adjustments have no effects on the rates in this market. 
Instability in the money market can come from the bank reserve 
adjustment process o~ if aggregate ER. F ER. When this is the case, 
the bank reserve adjustment process is having a net effect one way or 
the other on rates in this market. When aggregate ER. is greater than 
ER, there is a net supp~ increase of assets to this market. This 
would raise rates. Banks are net sellers of their reserve adjustment 
assets to this .market in the attempt to build ER up to F.R*. When 
aggregate ER. is less than ER, ba."'lks will be net buyers in the market 
in their attempt to lower ER to ER.. They will be contributing more 
~o demand in the market than they are contributing to supply, and the 
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reserve adjustment factor will have a downward effect on rates in this 
market. Thus. instability in the money market rate which is caused 
by banking system reserve adjustment must therefore be explained by 
ditferences in F~* and Ea, and these differences must move in opposite 
directions. 
Before adding borrowing from the Federal Reserve as the second 
method of adjustment, the implications of combining all market instru­
ments of adjustment (i.e., Fed. Funds, Treasury Bills, etc.) into one 
reserve adjustment instrument should be discussed. Are there any com.. 
plications when the assumption of a single market reserve adjustment 
instrument is dropped? Suppose Federal Funds are used as a single 
proxy for all market reserve adjustment instruments. Then individual 
bank "surplus" excess reserve positions would be shown as a supply of 
Federal Funds, and a "deficient" excess reserve position would show 
up as a demand for Federal Funds. Now suppose Treasury Bills are 
added as a reserve adjustment instrument. A surplus could be reduced 
by purchasing Bills or by selling Federal Funds. Some banks would use 
one while others choose the other. This could result in a greater 
a.ddition to supply than demand, or vice versa, for either one of these 
instruments even though aggregate ER* = ER. While aggregate ER* = ER. 
a. net demand for one instrument could develop while a net supply devel­
oped for the other. The reserve adjustment process would, therefore, 
be causeing rates on the two instruments of adjustment to move in oppo­
site directions. But, rates would not diverge far because banks with 
"deficienciestl would use the least costly instrument, and banks with 
"surpluses" would choose the higher rate instrument. The result would 
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be to drive rates on different market adjustment instruments together, 
and when ER. =ER. they are not as a group changing over time. Thus, 
there seems to be no problem in treating all market instruments of 
adjustment as one instrument (referred to as Ei). and as a single 
alternative to borrowing from the Federal Reserve. during the reserve 
adjustment process. 
n. 	THE EFFF;CT OF BORROWING FROM THE FEDERAL RESE..'lVE ON MONEY 

MARKET RATES 

The way in which banking ~stem primary reserve adjustment can 
affect the money market has been shown above. There must be dis. 
equilibrium in ER and ER.. Attempts to correct thi.s disequilibrium 
by buying or selling Et influence rates in the money market. To the 
extent borrowing from the Federal Reserve is used instead of market 
instruments of adjustment, the effects of banking ~stem reserve 
adjustment on the money market can be mitigated. W1l1 borrowed reserves, 
in fact, be expected to behave in a manner that woul.d mitigate money 
market movements that are the result of primary reserve adjustment? 
It. is the preliminary conclusion of this paper that they will. When 
there are tldeficient" excess reserves. the banking system is a net 
demander of E1 assets. This would tend to raise maney market rates. 
The greater ER. is over ER, the faster banks will be trying to sell 
11 and the greater will be their upward influence OR market rates per 
unit time. Now; borrowing from the Federal Reserve can be added as 
a .method of adjustment, and it would be expected to behave in a manner 
described in Chapter V. If banks were at first in equilibrium with 
52 

respect to borrowed reserves, a rise in market rates caused by a 
"deficient" excess reserve position would increase borrowed reserves, 
and this method of adjustment would reduce the net amount of F~ assets 
supplied to the money market for any given ER*>ER. This would reduce 
the change in market rates caused by primar.Y reserve adjustment. The 
assumption that borrowed reserves were in equilibrium in the first place 
aeans the effective cost of borrowed reserves is equal to the market 
rata of return and there is no incentive to increase borrowed reserves. 
A "surplus" in the excess reserve position of banks would mean the 
bank reserve adjustment process is having a downward influence in 
money market rates. To the extent borrowing from the Federal Reserve 
1s reduced in response to the decline in market rates, ER would be 
lowered toward ER. without net purchases of E:t. assets by the banking 
system. Therefore, the existence of borrowing from the Federal Reserve 
as an alternative adjustment instrument to the purchase and sale of E1, 
1s a mitigating factor on market rate movements caused by banking system 
primary reserve adjustment. This is because the greater the difference 
between ER* and ER, the greater the change in borrowed reserves in a 
direction which reduces the need to use Et as an instrument of adjustment. 
This use of E:t. in reserve adjustment is the proximate cause of money 
market rate movements.50 
'!he above analysis has shown that borrowed reserve behavior would 
be expected to lessen money market rate movement once disequilibrium 
50 The analysis so far has assumed the discount rate to be con­
stant. Borrowed reserves would behave in the same direction if market 
rate changes were taken as changes relative to the discount rate. 
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in ER and ER. started their movement in one direction or another. 
Whether or not central bank lending will lessen the cause of bank 
reserve adjustment pressure on money market rates is another question. 
Instability in the money market has been previously defined as rapid 
and directional changes in rates. Thus, for bank reserve adjustment 
to cause rate instability, the aggregate reserve position of banks 
must be in disequilibrium in opposite directions over rel.8.tively short 
periods of time. This means ER must be greater than EHo*, and then 
less than ER, etc., over time. In this way, banks would shift from 
net demanders of El to net suppliers of El and influence money market 
rates in opposite directions. To eliminate this cause of money market 
instability. the behavior of borrowed reserves would have to reduce 
the tendency of ER. and ER to shift ar.ound. In other worda. it w.ould 
have to reduce instability in the ER. and ER. 
Federal Reserve lending practice must stabilize ER* b.y stabil­
izing its two main arguments-OC and ECD. The tendency of borrowed 
reserves to mitigate rate movements once they are started is a factor 
that would work to stabilize OC. This is because lower fluctuation 
in market rates lowers Sg and stabilizes r. But, there is no apparent 
reason to expect the postulated borrowed reserve behavior to affect 
the ECD argument. The effect of the borrowed reserve behavior on 
actual excess reserves (ER) and. therefore, on money market rates 
will be discussed below. 
This section has applied the postulates on borrowed reserve 
behavior with respect to market rates and the discount rate to the 
reserve adjustment process. It has shown how the banking S,Ystem 
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reserve adjustment process influences money market rates. Borrowed 
reserve behavior was seen as a mitigating factor on such money market 
rate movements. In doing this, it does tend to stabilize Ea* through 
the OC argument. Instability in ER* and ER were shown to be the cause 
of reserve-adjustment induced instability on money market rates. 
Thus, there are reasons to believe the behavior of borrowed reserves 
would tend to reduce instability in money market rates. The ana~sis 
points to tendencies on~. The strength and magnitude of the relation­
ships are not known. 
III. THE EFFEcr OF BORRC1t1ING FROM THE FEDERAL RESERVE 

ON MONETARY CONTROL 

The conditions under which borrowed reserve behavior can improve 
monetar,y control were given in Chapter III. The supp~ of reserves 
to the banking system is: 
Rs = t (S, B, X) 
It B behaved in a w~ to offset unwanted movements in the market 
determined variables summarized in I, it would improve monetar,y con­
trol. It B behaves in a manner to offset changes in the controlled 
variable S, it is diminishing monetary control. Is there anything 
to indicate that B would behave different~ toward the controlled 
variable S than the market determined variables in 11 The answer is 
yes. B would more likely behave in a manner to offset changes in the 
controlled variable S than the market determined variables in X. A 
purchase in securities by the Federal Reserve (increase in S) is an 
indication that it is Fed's policy to increase Ra- This action would 
tend to lower markot rates. According to the previously postulated 
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relationship between market rates and borrowed reserves, this lower 
market rate would decrease B, and this would offset part of the in­
crease in S. Likewise, a sale of securities by Fed would indicate 
a poliqy of reducing Rs- This sale would tend to raise market rates, 
and this, in turn, would increase borrowing. The rise in B would 
offset at least part of the policy change in S. This offsetting 
direction that B would be likely to move in response to a change in S 
would be known, but the magnitude would not. This would depend on the 
change in market rates for a given change in S, and the change in 
B for a given change in market rates. 
On the other hand. there is no apparent reason to think B would 
act to offset unwanted changes in the market determined variables. 
B would not be expected to automatically offset unwanted change in 
the variables in X. Therefore, in this analysis. the behavior of 
borrowed reserves is seen as d1m1n1sbing the central bank control 
over the supply of reserves to the banking system. It does this by 
weakening the link between the controlled variable S and the object 
to be controlled-Rs• Also, borrowed reserves would not be expected 
to offset unwanted changes in the market determined variables of the 
primary reserve supply model. 
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY 
This paper has attempted to clari.fy the issues and relationships 
to be considered in understanding the effects of borrowed reserves 
on the supp~ of reserves to the banking system and on money market 
ra.te stability. These include the following: 
1. The relationship -of the reserve adjustment process to the 
money market (Chapter VI). 
2. The relation of borrowed reserves outstanding to market rates 
of' interest and the discount rate (Chapter V). 
). The relation of' borrowed reserves to policy directed open 
market operations (Chapter VI). 
The implications of the ~sis for the two objectives of 
discount ref'orm can be summarized as follows: 
1. 	 Borrowed reserves are likely to behave in 8. manner to 
mitigate money market rate movements which are caused 
b,y primar,y reserve adjustment. The reasons for reserve­
adjustment induced instability in money market rates-­
instability in .the supply and demand for excess reserves 
--may also be reduced by borrowed reserve behavior, how­
ever central bank lending alone cannot be expected to 
eliminate this cause of' money market instability. 
2. 	 The an~sis also gave reasons to believe that borrowed 
reserves behavior would deminish the central banks con­
trol over the supp~ of reserves to the banking system. 
The nature of' the relationships under~ these conclusions 
has been shown, but a test of their strength is an empirical task 
which has yet to be undertaken. 
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